About a symmetric three-players zero-sum game we will show the following results.
Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and the existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. We will show the following results.
1. A modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
2. The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy.
Thus, they are equivalent. However, without the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy there may exist an asymmetric equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game.
An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly. Suppose that there are three firms, A, B and C in an oligopolistic industry. Let̄,̄andb e the absolute profits of the firms. Then, their relative profits are
We see
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-sum game 1 . If the oligopoly is asymmetric because the demand function is not symmetric (in a case of differentiated goods) or firms have different cost functions (in both homogeneous and differentiated goods cases), maximin strategies and minimax strategies of firms do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if the demand function is symmetric and the firms have the same cost function, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The model and Sion's minimax theorem
Consider a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. There are three players, A, B and C. The strategic variables for Players A, B and C are, respectively, , , , and ( , , ) ∈ × × . , and are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces. The payoff function of each player is ( , , ), = , , . We assume , and are continuous on × × , quasi-concave on for each ∈ , ≠ , and quasi-convex on for ≠ for each ∈ , = , , .
1
About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014a) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014b) , Tanaka (2013a) , Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997) Symmetry of a game means that the payoff functions of the players are symmetric, and in the payoff function of each Player , Players and , , ≠ , are interchangeable. If the game is symmetric and zero-sum, we have
for given ( , , ). Also , and are identical. Denote them by . Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) for a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let and be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological spaces, and let ∶ × → ℝ be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005) . When is given, ( , , ) is a function of and . We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the following equation
Now we assume
that is, the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player A coincide given .
In (2) and this assumption Players A, B and C are mutually interchangeable. Let be a value of . Consider the following function;
Since is continuous and is compact, this function is also continuous. Thus, by the Glicksberg fixed point theorem (Glicksberg (1952) ) there exists a fixed point. Denote it by. satisfies arg max ∈ min ∈ ( , ,) =.
Based on Assumption 1 we present a modified version of Sion's minimax theorem. We assume that arg max ∈ min ∈ ( , , ) and arg min ∈ max ∈ ( , , ) are unique, that is, single-valued. By the maximum theorem they are continuous in . Also, throughout this paper we assume that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy of players in any situation are unique, and the best response of players in any situation is unique.
The main results
Consider a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. If the Nash equilibrium is symmetric, * , * and * are equal at equilibria. Then, ( * , * , * ), ( * , * , * ) and ( * , * , * ) are equal, and by the property of zero-sum game they are zero. We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game implies the modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy at the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. 1. Let ( * , * , * ) = ( * , * , * ) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a three-players zero-sum game. Then, ( * , * , * ) = max ∈ ( , * , * ) ≥ ( , * , * ).
Since the game is zero-sum, ( , * , * ) + ( , * , * ) + ( , * , * ) = 0. 
Because the game is symmetric and zero-sum, 
Therefore, if 1 ≠, there may exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium denoted as follows.
(, 1 ,)
In which only = 1 .
Concluding Remark
In this paper we have shown that a modified version of Sion's minimax theorem with the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy is equivalent to the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric three-players zero-sum game. We want to extend this result to more general multi-players zero-sum game.
